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DEATH, TAXES, AND PROPERTY (RIGHTS): 
NOZICK, LIBERTARIANISM, AND THE ESTATE TAX 
Jennifer Bird-Pollan*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last twelve years the estate tax has been eviscerated.  Evolving from a 
tax at 55% on all estates over $675,000 to a tax at only 35% on estates over $5.12 
million per person ($10.24 million for a married couple); the estate tax now taxes 
only about 5,300 estates per year, as opposed to over 58,000 estates in 1999.1  In an 
era of language decrying class warfare, why abandon this project of the estate tax?  
Is it too late to save the tax?  Are there reasons to save it?  Why have an estate tax 
                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.  The Author is grateful to 
participants in the Fall 2012 Harvard Tax Policy Seminar, the 2012 Junior Tax Scholars Conference, the 
2012 Law, Society, and Taxation Workshop, the 2012 Victoria-Cornell Colloquium: Jurisprudential 
Perspectives on Taxation, the Fall 2013 University of Florida Tax Policy Seminar, and the University of 
Kentucky College of Law Brownbag Workshop for helpful feedback on the ideas presented in this 
Article.  The Author is also grateful for written comments from Professors Neil Buchanan, Brian L. 
Frye, Daniel Halperin, Kristin Hickman, Larry May, Goldburn Maynard, Stephen Shay, W. Bradley 
Wendel, and Lawrence Zelenak.  Thanks also go to the excellent editors of the Maine Law Review.  
 1. The estate tax is levied by Internal Revenue Code, Section 2001.  Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2001 (2011 & Supp. 2013) [all references to Title 26 of the United States Code 
Annotated will hereinafter be referred to as the “Code”].  Before the passing of the Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat 38 [hereinafter EGTRRA], the 
Code provided a lifetime credit against tax transfers up to $675,000, see Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. 
Raub, & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., 
Summer 2007, at 118, 122, fig. D.  Any transfers made, whether inter vivos or after death, that exceeded 
the credit amount were taxed at 55%.  Id. at 122 & fig. D.  EGTRRA slowly increased the lifetime credit 
amount and simultaneously lowered the rate, culminating in a one-year repeal of the estate tax in 2010.  
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 
2012 TO 2022, at 74 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/ 
43539-08-22-2012-Update_One-Col.pdf [hereinafter UPDATE TO THE BUDGET].  The peculiarities of 
EGTRRA resulted in a complete sunsetting of the law on December 31, 2010.  See MINDY R. LEVIT ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42884, THE “FISCAL CLIFF” AND THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF 
ACT OF 2012, at 5 (2013).  Congress and President Obama signed a two-year extension of the EGTRRA 
provisions, including a reinstitution of the estate tax with a $5 million lifetime credit (indexed for 
inflation) and a 35% rate on amounts transferred above the credit amount.  Id.  That extension expired 
on December 31, 2012, at which point the estate and gift tax credit and rate were scheduled to revert to 
2001 levels.  UPDATE TO THE BUDGET, supra, at 74.  The Congressional Budget Office estimated that 
extending the EGTRRA estate and gift tax provisions that lowered the transfer tax rate and increased the 
lifetime credit amount would have cost approximately $402 billion over the period of 2010 to 2019, as 
compared with the revenue that would have been raised if EGTRRA had been allowed to expire.  Id. at 
64; 2 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 239 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10294/08-06-budgetoptions.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET OPTIONS].  
Leaving the 2009 rates and exemption levels in place would have raised a total of $420 billion (or 1.2% 
of total revenues) from 2010 to 2019.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: 
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 1 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10841/12-18-estate_gifttax_brief.pdf. Instead of these options, Congress and 
the President reached an agreement to avoid going over the so-called “fiscal cliff.”  See LEVIT, supra, at 
1.  The agreement was reached in the final hours of 2012, and the bill was signed into law on January 2, 
2013.  Id.  The law sets the estate tax lifetime exemption-equivalent credit at $5 million, adjusted 
annually for inflation (which brings it to $5.25 million in 2013), see Code § 2010, and sets the tax rate at 
a flat 40% for amounts in excess of that amount, see id. § 2001.  The new tax law does not have a sunset 
date, and thus will not have to be extended by another Congressional vote.  See generally id. 
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in the first place? 
Libertarian arguments have become standard fare in the United States, in 
particular with regard to debates around tax policy.2  However, the libertarian view 
is not always fully unpacked, and often assumptions regarding particular outcomes 
seem to hinge more on expectations of the libertarian view rather than rigorous 
arguments about the topic at hand.  Libertarian arguments about the estate tax claim 
that this particular tax is economically inefficient and violates moral claims 
stemming from individual property rights.3  In this Article, I will examine the estate 
tax through a libertarian lens, and explain why a hefty estate tax is consistent with 
the traditional libertarian position.  I will begin by articulating Robert Nozick’s 
libertarian views on property rights, in particular the account he provides in his 
seminal work Anarchy, State, and Utopia.  I will then defend two lines of argument 
against the notion that the libertarian view of property rights is violated by an estate 
tax.  Finally, I will explain why a society can, unrestricted by moral constraints 
regarding the property rights of the deceased, set a default rule for post-death 
property rights that reflects that society’s values. 
As a preliminary matter, I would like to stress that this Article is not an attempt 
to respond to or critique libertarianism as a political philosophy.  A central part of 
this Article is to articulate Robert Nozick’s version of the libertarian position, and I 
begin my exploration of the estate tax by adopting that view.4  While I will argue 
that certain views that are traditionally taken to be libertarian views (such as the 
rejection of the estate tax) are not necessarily implied by the core tenets of 
libertarianism, this Article is not intended to argue against libertarianism as such.  
In this Article, I will accept Nozick’s libertarian political philosophical viewpoint, 
and explore the estate tax from within that perspective. 
The primary purpose of this Article is to dispute the moral claims to post-death 
property rights made by libertarians when they argue against the estate tax.  As I 
                                                                                                     
 2. I use the term “libertarianism” to encompass many different versions of the political and 
philosophical position that values free markets and limited government.  Examples of what I include in 
this definition of libertarianism include much of the work produced by the Heritage Foundation and the 
Cato Institute, as well as the writings of Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and—of course—Robert 
Nozick.  For one useful definition of libertarianism that reflects the concept underlying this Article, see 
Peter Vallentyne, Libertarianism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism (last revised Jul 20, 2010) (“Libertarianism, in the strict 
sense, is the moral view that agents initially fully own themselves and have certain moral powers to 
acquire property rights in external things.  In a looser sense, libertarianism is any view that approximates 
the strict view.”). 
 3. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); Alexander Tabarrok, 
Equality and the Death Tax, 15 THE FREE MARKET: THE MISES INSTITUTE MONTHLY 9 (Sep. 1997), 
available at http://mises.org/freemarket_detail.aspx?control=121; Laurence M. Vance, A Libertarian 
View of the Estate Tax, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUND. (Dec. 6, 2010), available at 
http://fff.org/explore-freedom/article/libertarian-view-estate-tax. 
 4. I also wholly accept that Nozick does not represent all of libertarianism, and that many 
mainstream libertarians disagree with Nozick’s positions in ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA.  
Libertarianism is a broad concept that encompasses many different views, and I cannot articulate, nor 
can I respond to, all of those views in this Article.  Therefore, I have chosen Nozick (as, in many ways, a 
founder of modern libertarian thought) as the centerpiece of this Article.  Throughout this piece I will 
use the word “libertarian” in place of “Nozick”, but I do not claim to be speaking for all libertarians 
when I do so. 
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will show later in this Article, my argument does not necessarily entail enacting an 
estate tax, nor does it require a particular level of tax.  I am merely trying to 
demonstrate that those who argue that the estate tax is an immoral violation of the 
private property rights of the deceased are mistaken.  This is not to say that the 
estate of the deceased should necessarily pass to the government.  It is just to say 
that we would need to determine as a society what rule to set, having no moral 
absolutes that would determine how we must set the rule. 
This Article offers two central arguments against the unimpeded transfer of 
property rights. First, I argue that the libertarian view of the moral establishment of 
property rights through mixing one’s labor with the world is inconsistent with 
establishing property rights in the children of those labor-mixers.5  Further, 
Nozick’s argument about the justice of particular distributions of wealth depends 
upon the consent of all involved to the original distribution from which the 
distribution in question descends.  I argue that when we discuss the justice of 
uneven inheritances and the concerns of intergenerational justice, we cannot 
assume that generations further down the line have consented to the distribution 
agreed to by their parents or their parents’ parents.  Instead, libertarian values 
require determining the justice of the “original distribution” anew each time.6  
Secondly, I argue that the libertarian view of morally justified property rights does 
not entail the right to transfer assets after death.7  For libertarians, the moral 
justification for property ownership stems from mixing one’s labor with the world; 
the individual who holds the moral right is that individual who has, in fact, mixed 
her labor with the world.  Once she dies, her moral rights end.  She no longer has a 
moral claim of ownership over the goods in question, as she did during her lifetime.  
As a result, without a law giving her a positive right to control the post-death 
transfer of assets she holds during her lifetime, the labor mixer cannot determine 
where the goods she owns in her lifetime will go when she dies.  Because the moral 
claim has ended, society can now determine where to set the rule regarding 
distribution of post-death property without concern that such a rule would violate 
moral rights.   
II. WHY FOCUS ON THE ESTATE TAX AND NOT THE INCOME TAX? 
This Article views the estate tax through the particular lens of Nozickian 
libertarianism.  As a necessary corollary to a discussion of the estate tax, I will also 
address issues related to the gift tax.8  However, in this Article, I do not evaluate 
the libertarian view of the income tax.  Many others have written on libertarianism 
and the income tax.9  The income tax is clearly a larger component of the U.S. tax 
                                                                                                     
 5. See infra Part V. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Because the estate tax can easily be avoided by the making of lifetime gifts, the estate and gift 
tax systems must, from a policy perspective, be contemplated together.  See infra Part VII. 
 9. See, e.g., JOSEPH CARENS, EQUALITY, MORAL INCENTIVES AND THE MARKET (1981); Richard 
Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW (Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul, 
eds., 1987); JOHN ISBISTER, CAPITALISM AND JUSTICE: ENVISIONING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FAIRNESS 
(2001); Richard Bulmore, Libertarianism Without Self-Ownership: Why Owning Our Bodies Would Not 
Entitle Us to All of the ‘Fruits of Our Labour,’ 16 UCL JURIS. REV. 1 (2010); Bruce Chapman & John 
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system than the estate tax is, but in this Article I have chosen to focus on the estate 
tax for the reasons discussed here. 
A. Incentives 
A discussion of “incentives” is often a central piece of any tax policy 
argument.  In particular, in the context of the income tax, proposals attempt to 
balance fairness goals with concerns about the incentive effects of the income tax 
rules.10  This discussion of the incentives (or disincentives) created by high tax 
rates and various deductions was central to the tax policy discussions of the 2012 
presidential election.11  Since the question of incentives is primarily an economic 
question, and debates about incentives often override questions of morality in 
contemporary tax policy discussions, I have focused this Article on the estate tax, 
where discussion of incentives is less prevalent. 
To be sure, there are incentive concerns in the estate tax, but they are much 
less significant than the purported incentives and disincentives found in the income 
tax arena.  For instance, in discussions of the income tax, certain arguments claim 
that lowering tax rates increases job growth.  Given that this increase in job growth 
would result in a larger tax base, it is possible that lowering tax rates could still 
result in more tax revenue, since the tax base would grow.12  If this correlation 
                                                                                                     
Quinn, Efficiency, Liberty and Equality: Three Ethical Justifications for Regulatory Reform, 20 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 512 (1982); Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the 
Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399 (2005); Richard A. Epstein, 
Taxation with Representation: Or, the Libertarian Dilemma, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 7 (2005); 
Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157 (1999); Thomas 
W. Pogge, On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy, 29 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 137 (2000).  
 10. See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
DEBATE OVER TAXES (3d ed. 2004); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate 
Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905 (1987); Louis Kaplow, 
Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L. TAX J. 139 (1989); Eric M. Zolt, The 
Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 86-98 (1996).  
 11. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Obama Goes on Offensive Over Taxes on Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/us/politics/obama-to-make-case-for-buffett-rule.html; 
Victor Fleischer, The Winners and Losers Under Romney’s Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/the-winners-and-losers-under-romneys-tax-plan; Trip Gabriel 
& Helene Cooper, Romney Refines Message on Taxes and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/us/politics/romney-pledges-to-keep-tax-deductions-for-
mortgages.html. 
 12. The amount of tax revenue collected is equal to the tax rate times the tax base (Rate x Base = 
Tax).  If the base increases enough, then lowering the rate would not necessarily lead to a decrease in 
tax collected.  In fact, it may lead to an increase in total tax collected.  This position, known as the 
“Laffer Curve,” has been endorsed by many conservative politicians arguing for a reduction in tax rates.  
The term “Laffer Curve” was first used by Jude Winniski in describing the economist Arthur Laffer’s 
view of the relationship between economic growth and tax rates.  See Jude Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, 
and the “Laffer Curve”, 53 PUB. INT. 3 (1978).  However, economists seem to overwhelmingly disagree 
with the assertions of the Laffer Curve.  For instance, in a 2012 survey of 40 leading economists, the 
survey participants overwhelmingly believed that a reduction in tax rates would fail to increase annual 
tax revenues within a five-year period.  See Chicago Booth, Laffer Curve, IGM FORUM (June 26, 2012, 
11:47 AM), http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-
results?SurveyID=SV_2irlrss5UC27Yxi. 
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were demonstrated, then there would be a strong reason to lower tax rates, based on 
the potential incentive effects the reduction in rates would create.  In that case, the 
discussion of incentives would be central to any tax policy consideration of where 
to set the rates.   
By contrast, with the role of incentives in discussing the income tax, the 
incentives and disincentives created by the estate tax are minor, and secondary to 
its primary function.  When proposals to eliminate the estate tax are discussed, one 
incentive function of the tax that arises is the concern that the current estate tax 
incentivizes charitable contributions.13  Since the current estate tax provides a 
100% charitable deduction, eliminating or reducing the estate tax would arguably 
reduce charitable giving.14  The current estate tax motivates charitable giving at 
death because every dollar given to a charitable organization avoids taxation.  
Rather than “lose” part of her estate to the government, the taxpayer has an 
opportunity to donate her estate to the charity of her choice.  Transfers to non-
charity heirs (children, for example) are subject to the tax.  Without the estate tax, 
taxpayers would have to choose between leaving their estates to their family (or 
other preferred heirs) and leaving their assets to charities.  In this alternate world 
with no estate tax, the worry is that charities will not fare as well; without the 
motivation provided by the tax, charitable giving would go down. 
Importantly, though, the estate tax is not the only tax tool with which to 
motivate charitable giving.  The current income tax model gives a deduction for 
charitable contributions as well.15  Since any incentive concerns about the estate tax 
and charitable deductions can also be addressed through the income tax, the 
incentive arguments with regard to the estate tax are not as potent.  
A second example of the potential role of incentives in policy discussions of 
the estate tax is the incentive the tax can provide to care for one’s family members 
                                                                                                     
 13. Section 2055 provides an unlimited deduction against the estate tax for amounts transferred to a 
charity (defined as a section 501(c)(3) non-profit entity) after death.  Code § 2055.  Section 2522 
provides an unlimited deduction against the gift tax for amounts that are transferred as an inter vivos gift 
to a charitable entity.  Id. § 2522.  In addition, section 170 provides a deduction against the income tax 
for the same contributions.  Id. § 170. 
 14. Allowing a tax deduction for charitable contributions makes it “cheaper” for the donor to make 
the contribution.  Assume an estate tax rate of 50% (the estate tax rate imposed by section 2001 as of 
January 1, 2013, is actually 40%).  If a taxpayer wishes to make a $100,000 donation to a charity, with 
no deduction available, the taxpayer must have $200,000 available at the time of her death.  The tax on 
the $200,000 would be 50%, leaving $100,000 to be transferred to the charity.  By contrast, with a 100% 
charitable deduction in place, it only “costs” the taxpayer $100,000 to make that same $100,000 
charitable contribution.  Or, with the same $200,000 available (and no estate tax in place), the benefit to 
the charity can be doubled, giving to the charity the full financial benefit of the transfer.  For a 
comparison of the deductibility of charitable contributions in the estate tax and income tax context, see 
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263 (2007).  
For an explanation of the phenomenon of charitable deductions in the income tax context, see Lilian V. 
Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 1307 (2012). 
 15. Code §170.  Granted, the deduction for charitable contributions is an itemized deduction and is 
therefore unavailable to taxpayers taking the standard deduction, and, as a deduction, has the odd effect 
of offering a larger (and proportionately larger) benefit to higher income taxpayers than to lower income 
taxpayers.  Id.  Despite that, all of the same arguments made about charitable contributions, incentives, 
and the estate tax can be made about the income tax as well.  For a comprehensive discussion of the 
charitable contribution deduction and its incentive effects, see Faulhaber, supra note 14. 
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by exempting from the tax certain transfers to surviving relatives.  One might argue 
that, because the estate tax provides an unlimited spousal deduction, in addition to 
a $5.25 million exemption amount for all other transfers, which amount is currently 
portable between spouses, the Code is creating incentives for a taxpayer to provide 
for her family members after her own death.16  While the marital deduction may 
provide an incentive to leave assets to one’s spouse in order to defer the tax until 
that spouse’s death, the lifetime exemption-equivalent credit does not create 
particular incentives to provide for one’s children.17  Since the credit is available to 
offset taxes owed on up to $5.25 million in assets, regardless of the identity of the 
heir, a taxpayer could get the benefit of the credit by leaving assets to a neighbor, a 
lover, or a trust created to protect her dogs.18  If policymakers wished to provide 
incentives through the federal estate tax to care for one’s children after one’s death, 
they could create a relationship-based exemption amount, such as in the model 
currently found in a number of state inheritance laws.19  Under a model that values 
sanguinity, transfers to close relatives (e.g., siblings, children, grandchildren) could 
escape transfer taxation altogether, while transfers to more distant relatives or 
unrelated parties would be subject to the tax.   
While the current estate tax does not provide many incentives to care for one’s 
family after death, as I have demonstrated, it would be possible to create a transfer 
tax system that would have those incentives.  Does that mean that incentives to care 
for family are an important part of an estate tax system?  Not necessarily, since we 
could—as we do currently—institute those rules elsewhere.  Many states have in 
place a series of laws that give priority to the rights of surviving spouses over and 
above the rights of a testator to determine the distribution of her assets.20  In 
                                                                                                     
 16. Code §§ 2010, 2056.  Assets are eligible, under section 2056, for an unlimited deduction when 
the decedent passes the assets to the surviving spouse.  This transfer does not use any of the lifetime 
credit available under section 2010.  Since 2011, section 2010 has included a portability provision, 
allowing spouses to “use up” the unused portion of the first-to-die’s lifetime credit.  Therefore, estate 
planning now permits the first spouse to die to bequeath the entirety of her assets to her surviving 
spouse, at which point the surviving spouse will have, in 2013, $10.24 million in wealth transfers 
sheltered by section 2010 credit.  In addition, certain states grant exemptions from wealth transfer tax if 
the inheritance is transferred to a surviving relative within a certain level of sanguinity of the decedent.  
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.080 (West 2013) (providing a 100% exemption from the 
inheritance tax for inheritances received by a “Class A Beneficiary,” where a Class A Beneficiary is 
defined as a surviving spouse, a parent, a child, a grandchild, or a sibling).  
 17. There is no federal tax incentive to leave an inheritance to one’s children, since there is no 
federal exemption or deduction for that transfer (outside of the lifetime exemption equivalent credit).  
By contrast, many states do provide tax incentives for making post-death transfers to children.  See 
supra note 16 (discussing Kentucky’s inheritance tax law and the tax preference granted to transfers to 
close relatives). 
 18. See Code § 2010.  There are no restrictions in the lifetime credit restricting the use of the funds 
transferred tax-free under this credit.  Id.  If assets are transferred to the transferor’s spouse, then they 
are exempt from transfer tax under section 2056, and if assets are transferred to a section 501(c)(3) non-
profit organization, then the transfer is deductible under section 2055.  See id. §§ 2055, 2056.  
Otherwise, the first $5.25 million in assets transferred during (or after) the transferor’s lifetime are 
creditable under section 2010.  See id. § 2010. 
 19. See supra note 16 (discussing Kentucky’s preferential inheritance tax treatment to heirs with 
closer sanguinity relationships to the decedent). 
 20. Many states have a “widow’s elective share,” which allows the surviving spouse to inherit a 
statutory amount of the decedent spouse’s assets, regardless of the wishes of the decedent, as 
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addition, at least one state gives priority to the rights of surviving children as 
well.21  If there is a federal policy goal to encourage (or require) taxpayers to 
provide for their family members after the death of the taxpayer, then there are 
much clearer and more straightforward ways to ensure that result than by creating 
exemption amounts and incentive structures through the estate tax. 
Finally, one might argue that estate tax policy must concern itself with the 
incentive effects the tax has on the lifetime earning power of the potential taxpayer 
or with the negative effects that the absence of a tax would have on the potential 
heirs.  If the estate tax is too high, an individual taxpayer (the future decedent 
whose estate would be subject to the tax) might have significantly less incentive to 
work, accumulate, and save over her lifetime, since she would know that, upon her 
death, a large portion of her wealth would be taken by the government.  By 
contrast, with no estate tax in place, the potential heir has less of an incentive to 
work, accumulate, and save over her lifetime, as she expects to inherit a large sum 
(undiminished by tax) when her benefactor dies.  In each case, the existence of an 
estate tax will play some role in changing the incentives felt by each of these 
individuals.  However, these incentives (or lack of incentives) are not the central 
aim of the estate tax, but are secondary elements that must be considered when 
crafting the actual rule (or when deciding not to have a rule at all).22     
B. Property Rights 
Another central theme in most discussions of income taxation, in particular 
when the discussion involves libertarian arguments, is the taxpayer’s absolute 
property rights and the income tax’s potential violation of those rights.  On this 
argument, property rights are inviolate.  Therefore, according to Nozick, “[t]axation 
of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor.”23  The libertarian theory of 
property rights takes a number of forms, and I discuss these arguments later in this 
Article.24  However, once one holds that strong property rights are an argument 
against taxation, then the discussion of the appropriate tax has to balance respect 
for that property right with the needs of the state or the cost of the services 
provided in order to determine the appropriate level of the tax.  In many instances, 
the strength of the property rights will be found to trump any right the state might 
have had to impose an income tax. 
However, strong theories of property rights become much more difficult to 
                                                                                                     
memorialized in a will.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-201 
(West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.201 (West 2013).  For a discussion of the history and status of the 
elective share, and an argument in favor of abolishing it, see Terry L. Turnipseed, Community Property 
v. The Elective Share, 72 LA. L. REV. 161 (2011).  
 21. Louisiana has the equivalent of an elective share for children who are under the age of 23, are 
mentally infirm, or are disabled.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (2003).  For a discussion of this 
provision, see RAY D. MADOFF ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 6003 (2009). 
 22. Certainly, unintended incentives that are created by the existence or expansion of an estate tax 
are something to be avoided.  This will affect the structure of the tax, and might ultimately caution 
against certain structural characteristics.  For an argument that the unintended negative incentive effects 
created by the estate tax are significant, see Edward McCaffrey, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer 
Taxation, 104 YALE. L.J. 283 (1994). 
 23. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169 (1974). 
 24. See infra Part III. 
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defend in the context of the estate tax, since the property in question can no longer 
properly be said to “belong” to the taxpayer.  The taxpayer is dead.  Certainly in 
many instances society does respect the property rights (and the wishes) of the 
deceased,25 but in each case the law reserves the ability to violate that property 
right if it determines that doing so is in the best interest of the state.26  The same 
libertarian-Lockean arguments about the moral claim of a property holder who 
mixes her labor with the property are much harder to defend when that labor-mixer 
is no longer alive to make the claim herself.27  In this way, a discussion of the 
estate tax, as opposed to the income tax, goes some way towards minimizing the 
property rights claims that invade discussions of the legitimacy of the government 
imposing tax on its citizens.  
C. Revenue Raising 
One central rationale for the existence of any tax regime is the satisfaction of 
the government’s revenue needs.  Currently, the United States government raises 
approximately $2.3 trillion annually through the collection of all taxes.28  The 
individual income tax raises approximately $1.1 trillion annually.29  By contrast, 
the estate tax only raised about $40 billion in 2011.30  The amount raised by the 
estate tax has decreased dramatically in the past decade, as the phased-in tax 
                                                                                                     
 25. For instance, state law typically strives to respect the wishes of a decedent who creates a 
foundation or trust, or who expresses via a testamentary will her wishes regarding the dispersal of her 
assets.  This can go beyond the clear language of the will, allowing courts to amend wills to reflect what 
they believe was the decedent’s intention.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.615 (West 2013) (“Upon 
application of any interested person, the court may reform the terms of a will, even if unambiguous, to 
conform the terms to the testator’s intent if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the 
accomplishment of the testator’s intent and the terms of the will were affected by a mistake of fact or 
law, whether in expression or inducement. In determining the testator’s original intent, the court may 
consider evidence relevant to the testator’s intent even though the evidence contradicts an apparent plain 
meaning of the will.”). 
 26. Indeed, this set of laws seems to be honored in the breach, since most cases that arise are 
examples of the government or a third party exercising its right to violate the wishes of the decedent.  
See supra notes 20, 21 and accompanying text (discussing a widow’s elective share and children’s 
elective share). In addition, the cy pres doctrine permits a state’s Attorney General (AG) to violate the 
terms of a charitable trust when the AG determines that the charitable purpose of the trust cannot be 
satisfied within the restrictions of that trust.  For a discussion of the cy pres doctrine and its effect on 
charitable giving and trusts, see Edith L. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 382 
(1959), Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1307 (2010), and 
Frances Howell Rudko, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States: From Extreme Reluctance to 
Affirmative Action, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 471 (1998).  
 27. For a discussion of the Lockean argument regarding property rights, see infra Part III.  For a 
discussion of why Locke’s argument regarding property rights no longer works after the death of the 
labor mixer, see infra Part V.C. 
 28. UPDATE TO THE BUDGET, supra note 1, at 74. 
 29. Id. at 8.  Notably, the individual income tax revenues include the collection of taxes on all 
partnerships and sole proprietorships, since the United States income tax regime treats those entities as 
generating income that passes through to the individual partners of the entity, and therefore that income 
is reported on the returns of the individual taxpayers.  See Code § 701.  This, of course, increases the 
total amount collected under the individual income tax, by adding amounts collected from entities 
organized as partnerships to the individual income tax.  Entities organized as corporations have taxes 
imposed (and revenue counted) by the corporate income tax.  Id. § 11. 
 30. UPDATE TO THE BUDGET, supra note 1, at 74. 
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provisions enacted as part of EGTRRA (the so-called “Bush tax cuts”) have taken 
effect.31  However, even back in 2000, before the enactment of the Bush tax cuts, 
the estate tax represented only about 3% of all revenues collected by the federal 
government.32 
The individual income tax plays a central role in the United States 
government’s annual revenue raising.  Given that there are minimum amounts the 
government needs to operate annually, there is only so much flexibility that 
Congress has to amend the income tax code.  Changes to the revenue collection 
powers of the income tax are part of a larger discussion about government spending 
and the budgeting plans of the federal government.33  Discussions about the 
appropriate levels for the income tax lead unfailingly to larger discussions about 
spending and government borrowing.34  However, discussions of the estate tax are 
able to sidestep those issues, at least to some degree.  Because revenues collected 
from the estate tax represent such a relatively small amount of total tax revenues, 
discussions of the policy behind the estate tax can happen without the concern that 
eliminating the tax would hamstring the entire operation of the government.  Given 
the current size of the revenues collected via the individual income tax, it is entirely 
impractical to talk of eliminating the tax altogether without simultaneously talking 
about radical shifts in the federal budget.  However, one could make a legitimate 
argument in favor of eliminating the estate tax without the concern that the budget 
as we know it would entirely fall apart.  
It is noteworthy, however, that opponents and proponents of the estate tax 
                                                                                                     
 31. EGTRRA was enacted in 2001, raising the exemption amount from $675,000 to $1 million and 
lowering the rate from 55% to 50%.  EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 521, 511, 115 Stat. 38, 71, 70.  
The original bill was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2010, at which time the law would have 
rolled back to what it had been in 2001.  Id. § 901, 115 Stat. at 150.  During the final year of the 
statute’s effectiveness, before the scheduled sunset of the bill, the estate tax was entirely repealed, 
allowing estates to transfer to heirs without the imposition of federal transfer tax.  Id. § 501, 115 Stat. at 
69.  However, on December 16, 2010 Congress passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, which extended the tax cuts for another two years (until 
December 31, 2012).  Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296.  On January 2, 2013, President Obama 
signed into law the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) which made many of the tax cuts 
permanent.  See Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013).  With regard to the estate tax, ATRA set 
the exemption equivalent amount at $5 million, with an annual inflation adjustment (leading to an 
exemption equivalent credit of $5.25 million in 2013) and set the tax rate at 40%.  Id. at § 101, 126 Stat. 
at 2317-18. 
 32. BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 1. 
 33. Republicans typically argue that government spending must be cut so that taxes can be lowered (or 
remain the same), while Democrats typically argue that taxes must remain the same (or be increased) so that 
spending can be increased (or remain the same).  For examples of these arguments in the most recent U.S. 
presidential election, see Transcript of the Third Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/us/politics/transcript-of-the-third-presidential-debate-in-boca-raton-
fla.html.  
 34. Taxes are only one part of the calculation of the federal budget.  Necessary tax revenues must be 
considered in the context of required spending levels and permitted debt levels.  See Neil H. Buchanan 
& Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and 
Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1214 (2012).  With insufficient 
planning, the amounts of spending necessary to satisfy the needs of government programs cannot be met 
by the revenue raised through Congressionally approved taxes, nor satisfied by the amount of debt 
authorized under the debt ceiling.  See id. at 1182-83.  When the President finds himself in this 
constitutional “trilemma,” what must he do?  For an analysis of this question, see id. 
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view this issue through very different lenses.  Opponents of the tax argue that, 
given the miniscule amount of federal revenue raised annually through the estate 
tax, there is no coherent reason for maintaining the tax, and we could (and should) 
very easily eliminate it.35  On the contrary, estate tax proponents argue that, given 
the importance of the estate tax as a philosophical political matter, its unique role in 
the tax code, and given that it affects so few people, we should maintain the tax.36  
In either case, the size of the revenue generated by the estate tax is not entirely 
determinative of whether or not to maintain the tax, given that there is such 
widespread disagreement about what the size means. 
As a side note, in a time of diminishing federal revenues coming from all 
forms of tax in the United States, it is important to proceed with caution when 
proposing to eliminate one source of that revenue.  While the amounts raised 
through the estate tax are small, both in absolute and relative numbers,37 they do 
represent dollars that help to fund the annual federal budget.   
D. Redistribution 
 My decision to focus this Article on the estate tax rather than the individual 
income tax stems from the primarily redistributive purposes of the estate tax.  As 
discussed above, the individual income tax serves many different purposes; 
however, as demonstrated in this section, the estate tax does not primarily serve 
any of those roles. At its heart, the estate tax serves the purpose (or, at least, is 
intended to serve the purpose) of breaking up large concentrations of 
intergenerational inherited wealth, and using those funds (along with other funds) 
to support federal government spending, including spending on welfare programs 
such as the EITC, TANF and the federal food stamps program known as SNAP.38  
If one wishes to have a conversation about the merits of federally facilitated 
                                                                                                     
 35. This argument is regularly made in the context of arguments to reduce the size of government 
more generally, or reduce taxes more generally.  It is sometimes part of a larger “starve the beast” 
approach to tax policy.  See generally Bruce Bartlett, “Starve the Beast”: Origins and Development of a 
Budgetary Metaphor, XII INDEP. REV. 5 (2007).  But it is also an argument made by those who have 
other philosophical reasons for opposing the estate tax.  If the estate tax is morally unpalatable (the 
argument goes) and it doesn’t raise very much revenue, then why in the world should we keep it 
around?   
 36. Those who make this argument see it is as the natural conclusion of an argument in favor of the 
estate tax on other grounds (that it serves a redistributive function, that it curtails the amassing of large 
estates based on inherited wealth, that it encourages the circulation of assets).  Since the tax is so 
important, proponents argue, and since it is so unobtrusive in the lives of most U.S. taxpayers, we 
should clearly maintain the tax as part of the Code. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case 
Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffrey, 51 TAX L. REV. 
363 (1995); Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce 
Inequality, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013). 
 37. Small, of course, is a relative term here.  The $40 billion raised annually by the estate tax is 
clearly not small compared to most taxpayers’ annual salaries, or to the gross national product of a small 
nation. 
 38. For three of the ways the federal government offers financial support to the lowest income 
members of society see, e.g., Code § 32 (the Earned Income Tax Credit awards refundable tax credits to 
low-income working families, subsidizing salary in proportion to income-level and family size); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (2006) (the Social Security Laws granting temporary assistance to needy families); 7 
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036(a) (2006) (Food Stamp Act of 1964). 
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redistribution, there is no better example. 
This Article is concerned with the estate tax for all of the reasons stated above.  
It may be the case that many of the conclusions drawn in the Article will have 
broader consequences, especially in reference to the individual income tax.  
However, in order to avoid tackling the concerns identified in this Part, this Article 
will focus only on the particular matter of redistribution in the context of the estate 
tax.39  
III. NOZICK (AND LOCKE) ON PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
One cannot discuss the philosophical, political, or moral legitimacy of taxation 
from a libertarian perspective without first discussing property rights.  Since this 
Article is concerned with a libertarian view of the estate tax, we must begin with 
the libertarian view of private property rights.  In this Article, I primarily explore 
Nozick’s views on taxation as he articulates them in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.  
However, Nozick’s views on property rights are, at best, unclear.40  Because 
Nozick regularly appeals to John Locke in his discussions of property rights, I will 
refer to both Locke and Nozick in order to lay out the libertarian view of property 
rights, and then will adopt those views for the purposes of this Article. 
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick identifies three stages of property 
rights, and three forms of justice in relation to those rights: justice in acquisition, 
justice in holdings, and justice in transfer.41  I will address each of these in turn. 
A. Justice in Acquisition 
For Nozick, justice in acquisition is the criteria by which we evaluate the 
moral fairness of the original creation of property rights in an object.42  It is that 
original establishment of property rights that creates the moral basis for the later 
analysis of justice in holdings, and justice in transfer, so justice in acquisition is 
clearly a foundational part of Nozick’s argument.  He explicitly recognizes that the 
justice of holding property is contingent on the acquisition of that property when he 
says, “[j]ustice in holdings is historical; it depends upon what actually has 
happened.”43  Further, Nozick recognizes that, in order to prove one’s entitlement 
to a particular piece of property, one must be able to establish the justice of one’s 
acquisition of that property.  As Nozick famously writes, “[w]hatever arises from a 
just situation by just steps is itself just.”44  One might expect, then, that Nozick 
would lay out a careful argument for his view of justice in original acquisition; 
                                                                                                     
 39. Discussions of the estate tax necessarily require consideration of the gift tax, since the 
imposition of estate tax can be avoided by disposing of one’s assets during one’s lifetime.  As a result, 
one Part of this Article tackles the issue of the gift tax, but only as it relates pragmatically to the issues 
raised and addressed with regard to the estate tax.  See infra Part VII. 
 40. For an argument that Nozick’s theory of property rights is, in fact, incoherent, see Barbara 
Fried, Does Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK’S 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 230 (Ralf M. Bader & John Meadowcroft eds., 2011).  For an explanation 
of Fried’s views, see infra note 50 and the accompanying text. 
 41. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 151. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 152. 
 44. Id. at 151. 
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however, he resists making that argument.45  Although Nozick resists making an 
argument about justice in holdings, he endorses a natural rights version of justice in 
holdings.46  Beyond that relatively ambiguous claim, however, Nozick’s only 
explanation of what he means by “justice in acquisition” is a reference to the 
Lockean arguments regarding personal property rights.47 
On Locke’s view, the original moral claim of ownership, essential to a 
coherent theory of property rights, is established through the mixing of one’s labor 
with previously unowned things in the world.48  Once an individual has mixed her 
labor with the world by, say, tilling an acre of land, she can lay claim to that land, 
and her ownership claim will carry the weight of moral authority.  However, Locke 
included in his theory an important proviso: one can only claim ownership in a 
thing if one “leaves as much as another can make use of . . . .”49  Much has been 
written about what this proviso means; however, an extensive examination of the 
Lockean proviso is outside the scope of this Article.50  It is at least relevant to note 
that there is a great difference of opinion regarding whether Locke’s proviso relates 
only to the truly original acquisition of property rights, or whether it can continue 
to apply going forward.  In other words, Locke’s requirement that claiming an 
ownership right over land must leave as much and as good for others clearly would 
have prohibited the first European explorers to reach the New World from claiming 
all of North America for themselves.51  However, if four hundred years later, all of 
the land in North America is already claimed so that an individual with no money 
but plenty of labor available for mixing will have no chance of claiming property 
rights in that way, does that violate the Lockean proviso? And, further, how much 
labor mixing is required to claim property rights in land?52  It seems clearly 
                                                                                                     
 45. In Chapter 7 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick sets himself the task of identifying justice in 
acquisition, justice in holdings, and justice in transfer.  See generally id. at 149-231.  However, he 
writes, “[t]o turn these general outlines into a specific theory we would have to specify the details of 
each of the three principles of justice in holdings: the principle of acquisition of holdings, the principle 
of transfer of holdings, and the principle of rectification of violations of the first two principles.  I shall 
not attempt that task here.”  Id. at 153. 
 46. “Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them.” Id. at 
160. 
 47. Id. at 174. 
 48. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 133-146 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947).  
 49. Id. at 137. 
 50. For a further discussion of Locke’s proviso and, in particular, what it means for Nozick and 
libertarianism more generally, see Peter Vallentyne, Nozick’s Libertarian Theory of Justice, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK’S ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 145 (Ralf M. Bader & John 
Meadowcroft eds., 2011).  Vallentyne cites further to: MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT 
INEQUALITY (2003), HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994), and Peter Vallentyne, Left-
Libertarianism and Liberty, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 153 (Thomas 
Christiano & John Christman eds., 2009) (explaining examples of various interpretations of the Lockean 
proviso that one must leave enough and as good for others). 
 51. This is, of course, leaving aside that there were already people present in the land the explorers 
called North America, who had been mixing their labor with the land for centuries. 
 52. In his seminal work, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, written primarily as a response to 
Nozick, G.A. Cohen explores the question of what constitutes “mixing one’s labor” to a sufficient extent 
to establish ownership in conjunction with an exploration of Locke’s proviso that, in claiming a property 
right, one must leave enough and as good for others. G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND 
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insufficient to run a fence around a 300 acre piece of property and claim that one 
has mixed one’s labor with it, but is paying someone else to till the land sufficient 
for Locke’s purposes?  Is tilling the land once enough to establish morally 
meaningful property rights, or must the owner mix her labor with the land 
regularly?  Answering these questions is outside the scope of this Article, but 
because so much of Nozick’s central arguments will hinge on accepting this theory 
of justice in acquisition, it is at least worth raising them (something Nozick himself 
failed to do). 
B. Justice in Holdings 
Nozick’s conception of justice in holdings is classically libertarian.  Once one 
has justly acquired a property right, one’s rights in holding that property are 
absolute.53  Indeed, for Nozick, it is nonsensical to talk about the justification of a 
right to hold property once it has been justly acquired.  There is no property until it 
has been acquired.  “Things come into the world already attached to people having 
entitlements over them.”54  Property rights are inviolable, on Nozick’s model, 
although, like his arguments for justice in acquisition, Nozick does not make much 
of an argument for this view.  Primarily, Nozick’s position stems from a natural 
rights theory of property, arguing that property rights are absolute, and that 
violating or curtailing property rights—without explicit consent from the property 
holder—is an immoral and impermissible taking of those rights.55     
C. Justice in Transfer 
Given Nozick’s belief that the holder of a property right has an absolute and 
inviolate right over that property, it is unsurprising that he argues that a property 
holder has an absolute right of transfer as well.  Justice in transfer means that the 
                                                                                                     
EQUALITY 67-91 (1995). Cohen argues that Nozick never sufficiently establishes what the criteria 
should be for morally justifying one’s property claims.  Id.  
 53. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 160-64 (using the Wilt Chamberlain example to illustrate this 
argument). Nozick’s explanation of the freedom individuals have to do with their property what they 
will (limited only by the constraint that they must avoid injuring others or else compensate the injured 
for the injury), is explained later in this Article.  See infra Part V.B.  
 54. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 160.  The quote arises in the context of the following explication: 
Whoever makes something, having bought or contracted for all other held resources used 
in the process (transferring some of his holdings for these cooperating factors), is entitled 
to it.  The situation is not one of something’s getting made, and there being an open 
question of who is to get it.  Things come into the world already attached to people 
having entitlements over them.  From the point of view of the historical entitlement 
conception of justice in holdings, those who start afresh to complete ‘to each according to 
his ______’ treat objects as if they appeared from nowhere, out of nothing.  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 55. Natural rights theorists believe that the moral authority for holding or acting on a particular right 
stems from a pre-social, pre-legal authority.  This authority might be extra-worldly (God, angels, other 
deities) or it might stem from essential qualities of human beings (rationality, self-determination). By 
contrast, positive rights are those rights created by the state.  These rights do not exist until the state is 
established, which means that, unlike natural rights, a state could conceivably limit its citizens’ positive 
rights.  For a detailed explanation of the history of the natural rights theory of property, see Eric Mack, 
The Natural Right of Property, 27 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 53 (2010). 
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property holder has the right to dispose of her property as she wishes, unfettered by 
restrictions imposed by the government or other third parties.56  These transfers 
may include both a sale in a market transaction, or a gift or bequest, given freely 
and without the expectation of compensation.57  Although he does not explicitly 
make the argument for it, Nozick’s vision of justice in transfer includes the right to 
transfer one’s goods after death, which I will address later in this Article.58  Again, 
turning to Locke to fill in the gaps in the argument left by Nozick, we see that post-
death transfers are contemplated by this version of libertarianism.  Locke argues 
that a moral claim over private property stems from an investment of labor on the 
part of the property holder; thus, one might expect that Locke believed that the 
moral claim ended with the life of the laborer, but that is not, in fact, the view 
Locke espoused.59  Instead, Locke claimed that one of the rights a property holder 
has in her property is the right to transfer that property after her death.60 
D. Criticisms of Nozick’s Views on Property Rights 
My primary purpose in this Article is to examine the estate tax through the 
libertarian position, as opposed to providing a response to Nozick’s version of 
libertarianism. I will, however, briefly explore the more serious criticisms of 
Nozick’s views on property rights.  As I have explained already, much of what 
Nozick does say about private property rights he says without argument, adopting a 
natural rights view of property without defending his expansive view.  
Interestingly, though, at least one critic, Barbara Fried, argues that Nozick has no 
coherent view on property rights, ultimately conflating a variety of positions, and 
finally coming out as a utilitarian, rather than a pure libertarian.61 Fried’s argument 
traces the evolution of Nozick’s views throughout the three parts of Nozick’s 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.  In particular, she points to the fact that, although 
Nozick insists on the importance of obtaining explicit consent from property 
owners before collecting tax from them, he ultimately accepts that property owners 
can have their property rights limited so long as they receive compensation for the 
curtailment of their naturally held unlimited rights.62  Ultimately, the argument that, 
in the interest of all, the interests of a few can be ignored or overruled, is a 
utilitarian argument, not a libertarian one.63  Traditionally, utilitarians like John 
                                                                                                     
 56. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 150-51. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See infra Part V. 
 59. Locke expresses this position as follows: 
[I]f any one had begun and made himself a property in any particular thing – which how 
he or any one else could do shall be shown in another place – that thing, that possession, 
if he disposed not otherwise of it by his positive grant, descended naturally to his 
children, and they had a right to succeed to it and possess it. 
LOCKE, supra note 48, at 66. 
 60. Id.  For a longer discussion of Locke’s views on the rights of inheritance and bequest, and the 
way in which these rights potentially come into conflict, see infra Part V. 
 61. Fried, supra note 40, at 230.  
 62. Id. at 240-41. 
 63. The utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and others, requires the calculation of 
the rights and interests of the various members of a society in order to determine the morally right 
action.  Morality is defined as the action that provides the greatest benefit to the greatest number of 
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Stuart Mill, have held that, in order to determine the most moral action in any 
particular circumstance, one must calculate which action will maximize total 
happiness.64  Since any particular action may cause both some unhappiness and 
some happiness, utilitarians advocate using their calculus to weigh the respective 
advantages of any decision.  One famous articulation of this calculus is the trolley 
example, introduced by Phillipa Foot.65  In this example, a trolley driver is at the 
helm of an out of control trolley, which he cannot stop.66  He sees a split in the rails 
ahead with one workman on one of the rails and five workmen on the other rail.67  
The conductor must instantaneously choose which path he will take.  The utilitarian 
calculus compares the loss of one life with the loss of five lives, and determines 
that the moral choice of the trolley driver is to steer the trolley down the path with 
only one worker.68  Similarly, a utilitarian would argue that limiting one 
individual’s private property right—for instance, through the imposition of 
taxation—for a significant increase in the happiness of many other people—by, for 
example, increasing revenue available to fund government programs—would be a 
morally appropriate action.  This kind of moral reasoning would allow utilitarians 
to see a government taking or a zoning restriction as morally justifiable.  However 
these types of infringements on the absolute rights of individual citizens would be 
anathema to the moral feeling of libertarians.  Although Nozick, a libertarian 
endorsing a natural rights view of property, explicitly rejects the utilitarian 
calculus, certain of his arguments have a definite utilitarian feel.69   
IV. TAX STRUCTURES TRADITIONALLY ACCEPTED BY LIBERTARIANS 
Even the pure libertarian view of property rights, endorsing an inviolable set of 
rights that cannot be breached without consent, has historically been viewed as 
consistent with some kinds of taxation.  Libertarians have disagreed about the level 
of consent required in order to legitimately tax property owners, with Nozick 
seeming to require explicit consent received from every individual subject to the 
tax.  Libertarians with more pragmatic views argue that remaining within the 
society or accepting government-provided benefits are sufficient forms of implicit 
consent to legitimate the tax.70  Regardless of these differences regarding the 
                                                                                                     
people.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310 (1963); JOHN 
STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 129 (John Gray ed., 1991) .  
 64. MILL, supra note 63, at 137.  
 65. PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES 
AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 23 (1978). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Barbara Fried explains Nozick’s theory of compensation, in identifying the move from anarchy 
to the permissible minimal state.  Fried demonstrates that Nozick cannot, in fact, move beyond anarchy 
without authorizing occasional violations of individual rights, requiring that the injured party receive 
compensation from the injuring party, even (or especially) when the injuring party is the state itself.  
Fried, supra note 40, at 238-43. 
 70. Nozick makes clear his views of implicit consent when he writes that “everyone else realizes 
that tacit consent isn’t worth the paper it’s not written on . . . .”  NOZICK, supra note 23, at 287.  Earlier 
in the book he claims to have demonstrated that the reason a minimal state is not redistributive, when 
the amounts paid by some are used to pay for the protection of others, stems from the fact that those 
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necessary form of consent, libertarians have generally agreed that taxation as a 
payment for services received is a legitimate form of taxation by the government.71  
This kind of tax, justified by the so-called benefit principle of taxation, views the 
government as a provider of services, which in turn collects payment for those 
services in the form of taxes as part of a market transaction.72  However, citizens 
might argue that the government should limit the kinds of services it provides to 
those that only the government could provide, or to services where there is a 
significant increase in the efficacy of the service, or a lowering of the cost of the 
service when it is provided by the government.  The kinds of services for which the 
government could assess fees via the collection of taxes might include the 
maintenance of roads and sewers, or the provision of local and national security.73  
In a more expansive state, services might include public education, the regulation 
of markets, or the provision of public healthcare.  While a classic libertarian might 
balk at this second set of services, the libertarian position merely requires that the 
citizens paying for (through taxes) and receiving the services in question consent to 
have the government provide the services.74  
For purposes of this Article, which is centrally concerned with the estate tax, it 
is important to note that the payment for services/benefit principle model of 
taxation seems to fit most naturally with an income tax, rather than an estate tax or 
other transfer tax.  Because the services in question (such as maintenance of roads, 
national security, and garbage collection) would be provided regularly, an annual 
accounting of the cost of the services, and the amount of that cost allocable to any 
particular taxpayer, would be easier to administer than a lifetime calculation done 
via the estate tax.  In addition to the ease of administration, the income tax seems to 
fit the payment for services model better than the estate tax would, since it charges 
the taxpayer for the services in the general time period in which the services were 
received, rather than waiting until the end of the taxpayer’s life to calculate the 
                                                                                                     
who are receiving protection without paying are getting that protection for free in compensation for the 
rights they may have given up.  Id. at 114.  However, Fried demonstrates that Nozick’s lack of a 
coherent theory of property rights and consent lead to the result that, in certain circumstances (such as 
the move from a minimal state to a slightly more than minimal state), consent to limit the rights of 
citizens does not have to be explicitly attained.  Fried, supra note 40, at 235.  Fried claims that “in place 
of actual or implied consent, Nozick does away with consent entirely.”  Id. 
 71. In Nozick’s explanation of the shift from anarchy to a minimal state, he demonstrates the 
situation in which an individual could be compelled to pay for protection since she is benefitting from 
the provision of that protection.  NOZICK, supra note 23, at 110-18. 
 72. The benefit principle of taxation (authorizing taxation only to the extent that it compensates the 
government for services it provides to its taxpaying citizens) is not a view held only by libertarians.  
SLEMROD, supra note 10, at 86 (discussing the benefit principle of taxation, and an explanation of its 
ongoing role in tax policy debates). 
 73. Even Milton Friedman himself—in many ways the father of libertarianism—imagined that a 
government should provide certain services, and could therefore tax its citizens in order to receive 
payment for those services.  See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 65 (1967). 
 74. There is a tradition known as Left Libertarianism, in which a more expansive state, such as one 
that might provide the second set of services listed above, is more likely to be endorsed.  What Left 
Libertarianism shares with the tradition of Right Libertarianism is the insistence on the importance of 
consent in providing moral legitimacy to the government and it’s curtailing of property rights.  For 
examples of Left Libertarianism, see, for example, OTSUKA, supra note 50, and  THE ORIGINS OF LEFT-
LIBERTARIANISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HISTORICAL WRITINGS (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 
2000). 
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amount due.75  However, a society could elect to administer a payment-for-services 
type of tax as an estate tax.  That structure would use the end of life as a time to 
calculate the benefits enjoyed over a lifetime, and would assess tax to compensate 
the government for the benefits it had provided to the deceased.  There are several 
reasons that this is not the ideal scenario, not least because, if the potential taxpayer 
dies without any remaining assets in her estate, there would be no way to recover 
payment for the services the government had provided.76 
For the reasons explained above, libertarians might approve of an income tax if 
it were designed to satisfy the libertarian benefit principle requirements.  
Unsurprisingly, however, a wealth transfer tax that was justified as a method of 
redistributing wealth from the richest taxpayers to the rest of society is antithetical 
to the libertarian moral view.77  Because it would likely violate the principle of 
taking from the taxpayer only with her (implicit or explicit) consent, government-
facilitated redistribution through the tax code is immoral within a libertarian 
framework.78  I note this in order to emphasize that there is not necessarily a 
fundamental libertarian objection to the estate tax.  As a logistical matter, 
libertarian-sanctioned benefit principle taxation is easiest to administer through the 
income tax; however, an estate tax is permissible on libertarian grounds as long as 
the justification for the tax is limited to benefit principle grounds.  The Nozickian 
view of absolute property rights objects to taxation intended to redistribute when 
there has not been explicit consent to that redistribution.  The form of the taxation 
(whether the tax is assessed as an income tax or as an estate tax) does not affect the 
analysis. 
V. LIBERTARIAN INHERITANCE 
In order to explore Nozick’s libertarian position on the estate tax, one must 
first examine the libertarian position on the rights of inheritance and bequest.79 To 
                                                                                                     
 75. In most payment-for-services scenarios, payment is made in the general timeframe in which the 
services are provided.  Providing a lifetime of services and waiting for payment until the end of that 
lifetime seems to leave significant room for error.  
 76. Under the current system, individuals receive the benefits of government services and then must 
pay an annual income tax.  If an individual does not have sufficient funds available to pay the income 
tax that the government assesses against her, then the government has a variety of methods available to 
help it decide whether to forgive some amount of the assessed taxes, or collect from the individual in 
future years.  For a discussion of the way the government makes these decisions, see Shu-Yi Oei, Who 
Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance and the Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 421 (2012).  However, if a government held its collection of taxes until the end of an individual’s 
life, it seems significantly more likely that there would be no money left to pay the bills accumulated 
over that lifetime. 
 77. COHEN, supra note 52, at 68.  
 78. I note this in order to emphasize that there is not necessarily a fundamental libertarian objection 
to the estate tax.  Of course, redistribution could be consistent with a libertarian model, as long as the 
redistribution was explicitly consented to by the taxpayers involved.  Here one might imagine Warren 
Buffett, Bill Gates, and others insisting that they should be taxed more heavily in order for the 
government to have more funds available to support social welfare programs. ‘Patriotic Millionaires’ 
Lobby Congress for Higher Taxes on Rich, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/bb/politics/july-dec11/millionaires_11-16.html. 
 79. Throughout this Part, I reference particular state statutes authorizing rights of bequest, 
inheritance, or intestacy.  It is important to note, though, that Nozick, Locke, and other libertarians 
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clarify, a right of inheritance lies squarely with the heir.  If an heir has a right to 
inherit, then the heir has some version of a property right in the assets held by the 
testator, although that right cannot be exercised until after the testator dies.  
Although an individual explicitly named in the testator’s will may hold a right of 
inheritance,80 such a right may also be found elsewhere.  For instance, state 
intestacy laws create rights in individuals that the state has determined are the most 
likely to have been named beneficiaries of the deceased if that decedent had 
executed a will.81  However, some states move beyond mere intestacy laws, and 
create a right in the surviving spouse (or, in one case, the surviving children) to 
inherit from the assets of the deceased, even though the deceased explicitly 
disinherited them.82  Such laws value the rights of the survivors to inherit above the 
rights of the deceased to determine the distribution of her assets after she dies. 
In contrast with the right to inherit, which is held and exercised by an heir, the 
right of bequest is a right held by the deceased (the testator in the case of an 
individual who executes a will).83  The right of bequest is defended by libertarians 
as one of the rights contained in the inviolate absolute ownership of private 
property.84  In Nozick’s model, the right of bequest is evaluated as a moral matter 
within the purview of justice in transfer.85  If the asset is one that was acquired 
justly by the testator, and is transferred justly by her, then the bequest must be 
respected as morally permitted.  State statutory schemes regarding rights of bequest 
track these libertarian principles, respecting and enforcing most testators’ wishes 
through the probate process.86  
                                                                                                     
believe that the rights in question here are natural rights, not positive rights.  That is to say, a natural 
rights theorist believes that the right to inherit or leave the bequests one wishes exists regardless of the 
statutory schemes in place in any particular state.  On this model, the statute is merely a codification of 
the right, not a creation of that right.  For a further discussion of natural and positive rights, see 
generally Mack, supra note 55. 
 80. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.020 (West 2013) (stating that “[a]ny person of sound 
mind and eighteen (18) years of age or over may by will dispose of any estate, right, or interest in real or 
personal estate that he may be entitled to at his death, which would otherwise descend to his heirs or 
pass to his personal representatives, even though he becomes so entitled after the execution of his 
will.”). 
 81. State intestacy laws most commonly identify the spouse and children of the deceased as the 
individuals who inherit in the absence of a will.  However, if the deceased had no spouse or children, the 
statutes also create schema that identify who inherits the assets of the deceased.  See, e.g., id. § 391.010 
(explaining Kentucky’s intestacy law, which provides for the disposition of real property in the case of a 
decedent who dies intestate.  Succeeding statutes refer back to the real property statute in order to 
determine the disposition of personal property).  In certain circumstances, if no living relatives are 
found, the assets of the deceased escheat to the state.  See, e.g. id. § 393.020 (allowing unclaimed 
property in Kentucky to escheat to the state); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.055 (West 2013) (decreeing 
that if no person is entitled to take under the Oregon intestacy laws, then the estate escheats to the state 
of Oregon).  
 82. See supra note 20. 
 83. See, e.g., supra note 80. 
 84. See supra Part III. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Of course, the large exception to this general rule is the elective share rules. See supra note 20 
and accompanying text. 
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A. Locke on Inheritance Rights 
Since Nozick identifies himself as adopting Locke’s theory of property rights, 
and since Nozick himself does not explicitly address the issue of inheritance rights, 
I now turn to a brief examination of Locke’s views of inheritance rights.  This 
requires examining both the right of a decedent to leave a bequest, and the right of 
an heir to claim an inheritance.  As I demonstrate in this section, these rights are 
often (perhaps even always) in conflict, and in many cases cannot be 
simultaneously enforced. 
Locke’s belief in the absolute right of ownership in goods stems from his view 
that mixing one’s labor with the world creates a property right that includes a right 
of transfer and cannot be extinguished by a third party.87  Locke takes the right of 
transfer to include an unfettered right of transfer at death as well.88  In other words, 
an individual who holds property may choose to bequeath that property as she 
wishes.  If society respects this right, then any decision made by the deceased with 
respect to the disbursement of her assets must be honored.  This may include a 
decedent’s decision to disinherit her children or her surviving spouse. 
However, alongside the view that the wishes of the deceased must be 
respected, Locke simultaneously holds the view that children and surviving spouses 
have a right of inheritance as well.89  At various points in his writing on 
inheritance, Locke states that a surviving spouse or surviving children who are 
disinherited by the testator’s will should nonetheless be awarded an amount 
sufficient to allow them to survive comfortably.90  The familial relationship 
between the surviving family members and the testator creates a moral claim in 
those survivors that should be enforced by society.91  In particular, Locke focuses 
on the “surplus” that may exist in the estate of the deceased, arguing that surplus 
can be disposed of as the testator wishes, while the essential part—required care for 
                                                                                                     
 87. Locke begins by explaining that a man’s body is his first property, and then explains that it 
logically follows that the labor produced by a man’s body must also be his property.  “For this labour 
being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once 
joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.”  LOCKE, supra note 48, 
at 134. 
 88. J.J. Waldron, Locke’s Account of Inheritance and Bequest, 19 J. OF HIST. PHIL. 1, 44 (1981). 
 89. LOCKE, supra note 48, at 67-68 (“[T]his gives children a title to share in the property of their 
parents and a right to inherit their possessions.  Men are not proprietors of what they have merely for 
themselves; their children have a title to part of it, and have their kind of right joined with their parents’ 
in the possession which comes to be wholly theirs, when death, having put an end to their parents’ use 
of it, hath taken them from their possessions; and this we call inheritance.  Men being by a like 
obligation bound to preserve what they have begotten, as to preserve themselves, their issue come to 
have a right in the goods they are possessed of.”).  For a discussion of Locke’s position, see Leslie 
Kendrick, The Lockean Rights of Bequest and Inheritance, 17 LEGAL THEORY 145, 148 (2011), and 
Waldron, supra note 88, at 42. 
 90. “[O]ne of Locke’s justifications for inheritance is the right to parental support, the ‘Right [of 
children] to be nourish’d and maintained by their Parents, nay a right not only to a bare Subsistance but 
to the convenience and comforts of Life, as far as the conditions of their Parents can afford it.’ Locke 
says multiple times that parents have this duty and children this corresponding right.”  Kendrick, supra 
note 89, at 151 (quoting LOCKE, supra note 48, at 68). 
 91. See generally LOCKE, supra note 48. 
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the survivors—should be passed to the children under their right of inheritance.92   
B. Bequest and Inheritance – Incompatible Rules? 
So how can a property holder have an unmitigated right of bequest while a 
surviving family member simultaneously holds a right of inheritance?  In instances 
where these two rights conflict (the testator leaves all of his property to his friends, 
while his surviving children wish to claim an inheritance right in some of the 
property), what action should society take?  In situations where they conflict, must 
society enforce the wishes of the now deceased testator or of the surviving 
children?  Commentators disagree about the coherence of Locke’s view.93 
Ultimately, Locke’s view on the rights of bequest and inheritance appears 
utilitarian, rather than libertarian.  The role of society in allocating the goods of the 
deceased requires balancing the wishes of the deceased with the needs of the 
survivors and other social goals. 
VI. WILT CHAMBERLAIN, PATTERNS OF JUSTICE, AND THE LIBERTARIAN  
PROBLEM OF INHERITANCE 
Thus far I have explained the Nozickian libertarian view regarding property 
rights and inheritance.  I now turn to Nozick’s famous discussion of the effects of 
distributive justice, using the example of Wilt Chamberlain.  In this Part, I 
demonstrate why post-death property transfers are not required by any element of 
                                                                                                     
 92. Kendrick, supra note 89, at 151 (“A decedent’s estate must first provide for the subsistence and 
comfort of dependents, and only then may any remaining property go to satisfy the decedent’s bequests.  
If the entire estate is required by the right to parental support, any bequests are void.  The passages in 
which Locke discusses bequest without acknowledging the right to parental support must be understood 
to be subject to this qualification.”). 
 93. Notably, Waldron argues that Locke’s positions on bequest and inheritance are incompatible.  
He writes that: 
There is no way in which Locke’s ranking bequest ahead of inheritance can be justified 
on the basis of natural right, given his justification of inheritance.  We must, I think, 
dismiss this ranking in the end as a mistake on Locke’s part.  What, then, is the position?  
A man’s children have the right to inherit as much of his property as is needed to give 
them the benefit, after his death, of the continued fulfillment of his parental duties of 
sustenance and nourishment.  His wife is entitled to inherit as much of his wealth as she 
needs to continue to discharge her joint responsibility in this respect.  All this is a matter 
of fundamental natural law.  Natural law, however, allows no place for bequest or, for 
that matter, for the inheritance of surplus goods.  Does this mean that traditional notions 
of bequest have therefore no place at all in a Lockean theory of property?  Perhaps not.  
Perhaps bequest does have a place if we look upon the right to bequeath as a civil right 
rather than as a natural right. 
Waldron, supra note 88, at 47-48 (emphasis in original).  By contrast, Kendrick argues that the rights of 
unlimited inheritance possessed by the children or other natural heirs of the decedent actually arise out 
of the “imputed bequest” of the decedent.  Kendrick, supra note 89, at 161-62 (“[W]hen understood as 
imputed bequest, the right of inheritance becomes a default rule, imputing to the decedent a desire to 
transfer her wealth to those who are most likely to be identified with her life projects . . . . Thus, while it 
is true that Locke never explicitly presents a full theory of imputed bequest, we may plausibly read the 
Treatises to assume that parents, prompted by their ‘Natural Love and Tenderness’ and their close 
identification with both their children and their possessions, would in most cases desire that their 
property descend to their children when they die.  This means that the right involved is the right not of 
the children to inherit but of the parents to bequeath.”).  
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Nozick’s argument.  
A. Patterns of Justice 
In his argument concerning distributive justice, Nozick distinguishes his work 
from theories that attempt to establish patterns of distributive justice.94  On 
Nozick’s model, patterned principles of distributive justice identify a desired 
distribution of goods—either an end-goal or a goal evaluated at any particular 
moment in time—and then evaluate the current distribution by comparison to the 
desired pattern.95  Nozick is critical of patterned principles of justice because he 
thinks they will inevitably lead to a restriction on the right of individuals to freely 
contract for the exchange of goods.  In order to demonstrate this result, Nozick 
introduces his famous Wilt Chamberlain example. 
Nozick asks the reader to imagine an initial distribution of wealth that the 
reader believes is just.  Because Nozick does not want to preclude any particular 
distribution, he identifies this initially just (on the reader’s terms) distribution as 
D1.96  Then, he says, imagine that there is an individual, Wilt Chamberlain 
(Chamberlain), who has an incredible talent at playing basketball.97  People love to 
watch him play basketball, and, as a result, many people agree to pay him 25 cents 
for the privilege of watching him play.98  Say, then, that ultimately one million 
people pay a quarter to Chamberlain to watch him play basketball.  Each of these 
people has freely chosen to enter a contract with Chamberlain, wherein each of 
them pays 25 cents, and Chamberlain allows the individual to watch him play.  At 
the end of these million transactions, Chamberlain will have $250,000 above what 
he was entitled to in D1, and each of the one million people will have 25 cents less 
than he or she was entitled to in D1.  Nozick calls this second distribution D2.99  
We have, as a result of one million freely made transfers, radically shifted the 
original distribution.  However, Nozick says, we cannot complain that D2, which 
does not match the distribution we originally believed was a just distribution, is 
                                                                                                     
 94. See David Schmidtz, The Right to Distribute, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NOZICK’S 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 197 (Ralf M. Bader & John Meadowcroft  eds., 2011).  
 95. Id. at 204 (explaining that Nozick identifies Rawls’ difference principle—permitting inequalities 
in the distribution of goods only if the inequalities benefit the least well-off in a society—as a patterned 
principle with regard to distributive justice).   
 96. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 160. 
 97. Id. at 161. In another article criticizing the utility of Nozick’s example, Barbara Fried argues 
that while Nozick allows for the just distribution of goods and wealth in D1, he does not account for 
Chamberlain’s talent at playing basketball as a good that has been unevenly distributed.  It is this uneven 
distribution of talents, and the scarcity of the talent of basketball playing, that permits Chamberlain to 
demand 25 cents for the privilege of watching him play.  If basketball playing talents were distributed 
more evenly, or were not in such short supply, then Chamberlain’s fans would have been able to watch 
other players instead, and the price Chamberlain could command would likely fall.  Fried likens 
Chamberlain’s talents to an individual holding a large amount of land.  When the landholder exchanges 
that land for $250,000, we do not say that he is $250,000 richer.  We merely say that he has liquidated 
the asset he previously held in illiquid form.  One could make the same argument about Chamberlain’s 
basketball talents. See Barbara Fried, Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick’s “Justice in Transfer” and 
the Problem of Market-Based Distribution, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 226, 234- 236 (1995).   
 98. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 161. 
 99. Id. 
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unjust.100  Nothing unjust has occurred.  Chamberlain and each of the one million 
fans freely agreed to the transfers.  Indeed, Nozick argues that it would be unjust 
for someone (the government?) to try to make D2 match D1 by reallocating some 
or all of Chamberlain’s newly acquired $250,000 away from him, since he acquired 
that wealth justly.101 
Therefore, Nozick’s conclusion is that patterned principles of distributive 
justice necessarily violate individual freedom and property rights.102  In addition, he 
believes these patterns are ultimately unattainable, given the constant exchanging 
of goods that happens within a society.103  Given Nozick’s position that 
“[w]hatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just,”104 the Wilt 
Chamberlain model demonstrates that justice will result in radically different actual 
distributions over time.  Thus, seeing that D1 was a just distribution (based on the 
reader’s own conception of justice), and the transfers from fans to Wilt 
Chamberlain were all made freely (the very definition of just steps on Nozick’s 
libertarian model), then the end result—with Chamberlain holding significantly 
more wealth than his fans—must also be just. 
Combining this view of distributive justice with Nozick’s view of private 
property rights, it becomes clear why Nozick believes in unfettered bequest rights.  
Because property rights include the unrestricted absolute ownership of the property 
in question, and distributive justice must concern itself only with the free transfer 
of goods (rather than with the pattern of justice that results from those transfers)—
individuals must be allowed to transfer their assets as they wish, including after 
death. 
B. Chamberlain’s Children and the Libertarian Problem of Inheritance 
I have two arguments against the model of inheritance rights that Nozick sees 
as necessarily following from his views of property rights and distributive justice 
and will address each of them in turn. 
1. Future Generations and the Original Distribution  
Nozick begins his discussion of the Wilt Chamberlain example by introducing 
a distribution, D1, that he says the reader should imagine is whatever distribution 
the reader believes is most just.  The end distribution, D2, must be just, Nozick 
argues, because it was arrived at justly, in a way freely agreed to by all parties 
involved in the creation of D1 and the transfers that resulted in D2.  Moving from 
here, assume Chamberlain and all of his fans (call them the first generation, or G1) 
then pass their respective wealth on to their children.  Now the second generation, 
call it G2, begins life with D2, rather than with D1.  But G2 did not agree to the 
                                                                                                     
 100. Id. 
 101. NOZICK, supra note 23, at 149 (disputing the idea that there would be any individual or entity 
with the authority or even the ability to do that redistributive work – “[t]here is no central distribution, 
no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.” 
(emphasis in the original)).  
 102. Id. at 172. 
 103. Id. at 164. 
 104. Id. at 151. 
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justness of D2.  Indeed, G2 did not agree to the justness of D1 either!  And G2 does 
not include the members of G1 who freely engaged in the transfers that created D2.  
So how can we expect the members of G2 to accept as just the distribution created 
by others, in which they had no say, either with regard to the original distribution 
or to the “free transfers” entered into by their forebears?105 
Further, Nozick’s (and Locke’s) emphasis on the importance of mixing one’s 
labor with the world in order to generate property rights results in significantly less 
(or no?) moral claims in G2 for rights over the property that they inherit from G1.  
This is another tension in the relationship between Nozick’s view of justice in 
acquisition, transfer, and holding.  However, this tension is recognized in certain 
versions of Left Libertarianism, and was even recognized by Nozick himself in his 
later writings.106   
Nozick’s argument for the rights of an heir stems from a combination of justice 
in acquisition and justice in transfer.  Because G1 (presumably) mixed their labor 
with the world in order to generate morally meaningful ownership over their goods, 
they acquired the right to freely transfer those goods.  And because G2 receives the 
goods as a result of a freely made (post-death) transfer by G1, then they too have 
justly acquired the goods, and may hold them with the same moral authority with 
which G1 held them.  This may be true with regard to inter vivos transfers, but it 
does not address the second libertarian problem of inheritance. 
2. The Problem with Post-Death Property Rights 
In order to make, as Nozick does, the claim that property ownership rights 
include an unmitigated right of transfer, one must first establish that the individual 
making the transfer has the kind of moral claim over the property that I have 
identified as arising from the libertarian theory of property rights.107  In other 
words, the right to transfer is one of the rights held by a property owner, but that 
right, like all property rights, is contingent on owning the property in the first 
                                                                                                     
 105. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A. V. Miller, trans., 1977) (explaining 
that one central concern here is the determination of just what constitutes a “free transfer”).  Nozick 
might argue that his definition of free transfer transcends cultural and temporal boundaries, so that what 
constitutes a free transfer in the southern part of the pre-Civil War United States is the same as what 
constitutes a free transfer in New York City in 2013.  If that is true, then we needn’t worry that future 
generations might complain that the transfers which resulted in D2 were not, in fact, freely completed.  
However, there is a long tradition in political philosophy arguing that cultural norms evolve over time, 
so that what constitutes a free transfer in one society might be considered coerced in another.   
 106. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 28-33 (1989).  Many Left Libertarians recognize a 
more legitimate moral right in the taxation of heirs than in the taxation of income earners, since the 
moral claim to private property stems from the mixing of one’s labor with the world.  Because an heir 
has not mixed her labor, but has merely acquired property from another, this argument sees taxation of 
that individual as more morally permissible.  Nozick himself altered his view on inheritance taxation in 
later years, seeing the taxation of heirs as less morally prohibited than other types of tax.  As Nozick 
writes in The Examined Life, “. . . bequests that are received sometimes are then passed on for 
generations to persons unknown to the original earner and donor, producing continuing inequalities of 
wealth and position . . . . One possible solution would be restructure an institution of inheritance so that 
taxes will subtract from the possessions people can bequeath the value of what they themselves have 
received through bequests.”  Id. at 30. 
 107. See supra Part III. 
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place.108  This is where one encounters the problem of bequest and post-death 
property rights.  While a property owner may write a will and have the intention to 
make a post-death transfer during her lifetime, the effect of that will happens only 
after her death.109  But in what sense does she continue to have the property right 
after her death, such that she has the authority to transfer that property?  
In order to have a moral claim, or to have a right that is recognizable by 
society, there must be an individual, a subject, who can exert that right, or that 
claim.  After death, the individual ceases to exist. There is no subject available to 
claim the property right, and there is no subject available to enact the transfer.  As a 
result, it violates the libertarian notion of property rights to authorize an individual 
to transfer an asset after her death.  Enforcing a testamentary will is the equivalent 
of allowing the individual to transfer her neighbor’s property, since she has no 
legitimate claim of ownership over either her neighbor’s property or the property 
she claims to be transferring by will.  By the time the transfer effectuated by the 
will takes place, the testator will no longer have the morally legitimate property 
right that would allow her to effect a just transfer, unfettered by third party 
intervention.  Her moral rights cease with her life. 
In what sense could it be meaningful to say that a deceased person continues to 
hold property after her death?  To the extent that our current rules enforce the 
choices made by a testator in her will, they do so out of respect for the choices the 
testator made when she was alive, not because the document can be enforced by the 
drafter of the will.  Indeed, our tax system creates a new legal entity, the “estate,” 
which absorbs the rights and responsibilities of the person whose life has ended.110  
Where there is no subject or moral right holder present to claim the right of 
transfer, a rule that establishes a default, which may or may not respect the wishes 
of the decedent, need not concern itself with potential violations of that subject’s 
moral claims.   
VII.  ESTABLISHING A DEFAULT RULE 
In Part I, I argued that the existence of the individual claiming a property right 
ends at that individual’s death, and therefore, the property right must end then as 
well.  Therefore, there is no moral authority to the assumption that the decedent has 
the unfettered right to transfer her property as she wishes after her death.  Does that 
then mean that the government has a moral claim to the property?  Not necessarily. 
                                                                                                     
 108. One cannot bequest assets that one does not, in fact, own. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.250 
(West 2013) (“KRS 391.210 to 391.260 does not authorize a person to dispose of property by will if it is 
held under limitations imposed by law preventing testamentary disposition by that person.”). 
 109. See Code § 2001.  Some might argue that the effect of drafting a will is to transfer the asset 
upon the creation of the testamentary document.  However, our legal system does not recognize that as 
the moment of transfer.  Instead the transfer, and the attendant taxation upon that transfer, happens after 
the death of the transferor. 
 110. Id. § 2031 (defining the gross estate as follows: “[t]he value of the gross estate of the decedent 
shall be determined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death 
of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.”).  A number of Code sections 
explicitly address the way in which the estate, as a separate taxable entity, is responsible for the tax 
owed, and how potential heirs can recover contributions from other potential heirs of that estate.  See, 
e.g., id. §§ 2205, 2207. 
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When a person with property right recognized as morally meaningful on the 
libertarian model dies, there is no one with a property claim that is morally 
defensible from a libertarian perspective. 
This leaves us in an interesting position.  If, as Nozick and many other 
libertarians have assumed, moral claims of ownership extend beyond death, then 
their arguments that the estate tax (along with other forms of inter vivos taxation) is 
theft would be convincing.  However, as I have demonstrated, the libertarian 
argument does not actually entail that result.  With no individual or entity with a 
libertarian moral claim over the property, we are left in the position of deciding 
what rule to choose.   
At this point, we can bring back into our consideration all of the various tax 
policy concerns bracketed at the beginning of this Article.  One might consider 
incentive effects and revenue raising concerns when deciding what to do with the 
assets of a deceased member of society.111  On the one hand, society might decide 
that, as a matter of administrative ease, we will let the deceased draft a will telling 
us how she wishes the assets to be distributed, and we will distribute the assets 
according to that document. We may, however, decide that we have other goals that 
trump the goal of administrative ease in determining the best tax policy.  
Alternatively, society might decide that the goal of allowing for a more or less 
equal distribution of financial goods in each generation (a new D1, in the Wilt 
Chamberlain example) is a goal that takes priority in our tax policy, and therefore, 
we might enact a 100% estate tax, allowing the government to claim assets that 
have no owner, due to the death of the previous owner.  A third possibility is that 
the Lockean-Nozickian result would be to allow assets that are freed up upon the 
death of the property holder to revert to nature.  On this view, the true Lockean 
result would be to allow individuals to come forward to mix their labor with these 
goods, thereby establishing new moral claims over the assets.112 
The likely result is somewhere in the middle.  The goal of this Article, 
however, has been to demonstrate that each of these results is consistent with the 
moral view of property rights espoused by libertarians, in particular by Nozick.  
Because there is no moral compulsion to act on the wishes of the deceased, or to 
treat the government as having morally deserving property rights in the assets of 
the decedent, we can create a rule that best reflects the needs and values of the 
society in question without violating the moral rights of any party.   
                                                                                                     
 111. For a discussion of the potential policy considerations that might affect the decision to impose 
the estate tax in one form or another, see supra Part II. 
 112. This possibility of reverting to a war of all against all each time a member of society dies is 
strongly reminiscent of the Hobbesian state of nature.  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.C.A. 
Gaskin ed., 1996).  However, since Locke believes that an individual agrees to give up certain rights 
upon entering society, his view of property rights does not require this result.  See LOCKE, supra note 
48, at 185 (“The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself, and 
the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the 
preservation of himself, and the rest of society shall require; which laws of the society in many things 
confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.”).  Therefore, a society could establish a default rule 
regarding post-death property rights that did not involve allowing a “free for all” to claim the property, 
and that default rule would not necessarily violate Locke’s position. 
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VIII.  WHAT ABOUT GIFTS? 
Our current tax regime incorporates a gift tax with the estate tax, allowing a 
lifetime credit against both an individual’s inter vivos and post-death transfers.113  
Because this is a lifetime credit, once a taxpayer exceeds the credit, transfers made 
during her lifetime will be subject to gift tax, currently imposed at a rate of 40% on 
all transfers over the $5.25 million exemption equivalent credit.114  While the estate 
and gift tax are currently unified, that has not always been the case.  Between 1916 
and 1932, the United States had an estate tax, but no gift tax.115  This meant that, 
during that era, transfers made during the transferor’s lifetime would escape 
taxation, while assets held until death and then transferred post-death would be 
subject to the estate tax.  This lead, unsurprisingly, to an increase in lifetime 
transfers as individuals sought to escape the transfer tax regime.116  As a result, in 
1932, Congress enacted the gift tax as a backstop to the estate tax, ensuring that 
transfers would be subject to the tax regardless of timing.117  However, the gift and 
estate taxes were not unified until 1976.118  At that point the two tax regimes were 
partially unified, but the taxes were not fully unified until 2010, meaning that for 
almost seventy years the rates and exemption levels varied between the two 
credits.119   
I have demonstrated that the libertarian moral view of property rights is 
consistent with a 100% estate tax.120  But does this necessarily entail a gift tax as 
well?  Because of the libertarian view of the absolute moral claim of private 
property rights (of the living), Nozick would view a gift tax as an immoral 
violation of the rights of the property holder.  On the libertarian view, a property 
holder must be able to transfer her property as she wishes, with no limits on that 
transfer imposed by third parties.  The imposition of a tax on the transfer, which 
occurs when the government taxes a gift, is a fetter to transfer imposed by the 
government.121  This makes the gift tax impermissible on the libertarian model. 
If, then, society opted to impose an estate tax on assets that had been held by 
its citizens at their death, and all citizens transferred their assets during their lives, 
                                                                                                     
 113. See Code § 2001. The structure of the system allows a credit against taxes incurred on lifetime 
transfers up to an amount sufficient to permit a tax-free transfer of a set exemption-equivalent amount.  
Id.  Currently that amount is $5,250,000 per individual.  Id.  The credit must be used up chronologically, 
so inter vivos transfers will command the first use of the credit, and whatever has not been used before 
death will remain available to permit tax-free transfers after death as well.  Id. 
 114. See id. §§ 2501-2503, 2505. 
 115. See Jacobson et al., supra note 1, at 121, fig. C (illustrating, in part, that: the estate tax was 
enacted in 1916; the first gift tax was enacted in 1924, but repealed in 1926; the modern gift tax was 
enacted in 1932; and the United States has had both gift and estate taxes for all years since then (with 
the exception of the one year repeal of the estate tax in 2010, when the gift tax remained in place)).   
 116. See id. at 122. 
 117. See id. 
 118. BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 17 (10th ed. 2005) (explaining 
that before 1976 “it cost substantially more to leave property at death than to give it away during life,” 
before the estate and gift tax regimes were unified). 
 119. See Jacobson et. al, supra note 1, at 122-24. 
 120. See supra Part VI. 
 121. Certain Left Libertarians would view a gift tax as morally permissible, as long as it is imposed 
on the recipient of the gift, because it does not violate the property rights of an individual with a right 
that arises because of labor.  For more on this argument, see generally NOZICK, supra note 106. 
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would the tax become meaningless? Arguably, the answer to that question is no.  
The estate and gift taxes have not always been unified—and—even in years when 
they were not fully integrated, the estate tax did take in revenue.122  Further, 
individuals often have reasons to hold on to their assets, not wanting to whittle their 
wealth down to nothing before they die.  There are a variety of reasons for this, 
such as: wanting children and other relatives to remain dependent; wanting the 
safety net provided by accumulated wealth; and/or not trusting that others will 
spend the money wisely that would likely continue to exist, even in the face of a 
robust estate tax.   
Regardless of the logistical concerns of enacting an estate tax without a 
backstop gift tax, arguing for the moral legitimacy of a gift tax on libertarian 
grounds in the way I have done for the estate tax is unconvincing.  The robust 
libertarian view of personal property rights makes the gift tax immoral.  Although it 
might make an estate tax easier to enforce, a libertarian would argue that instituting 
a gift tax would violate the property rights of potential taxpayers.  Hence, the estate 
tax is consistent with libertarian views, but the gift tax is not.   
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
In this Article, I have demonstrated that contrary to popular political rhetoric, 
the libertarian position on property rights (often viewed as the strongest argument 
for property rights) is consistent with a robust estate tax, reaching even 100%.  
Because the death of the individual property owner ends the moral ownership right 
of that individual, the estate tax is not “theft,” as libertarians have often called all 
taxation.123  Instead, in the absence of any moral claims over the property, society 
is in the unique position of being able to design a post-death property regime that 
reflects the needs and wants of that society.  This may mean that society decides to 
enact a 100% estate tax, claiming all assets left by individuals upon their death.  
This seems unlikely, but such a plan would not violate the moral claims of either 
the deceased or any of that individual’s potential heirs. 
My hope is this Article will give us a starting place to think about the estate tax 
in a way that allows us to consider the variety of important tax policy 
considerations the tax could address.  Rather than thinking of the estate tax as a 
violation of the moral claims of any individual, the estate tax can be used as a tool 
to help us achieve desired social ends.  Society can move forward with its 
deliberations on the tax without fear that it is trampling on the rights of any of its 
citizens.  Indeed, on the libertarian view, the estate tax is in a unique position, 
allowing the government to collect revenue without the risk of taking from those 
who do not consent to the tax.  Even though Nozick himself failed to recognize it, 
the estate tax should be held up as the model of a libertarian tax. 
                                                                                                     
 122. See BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 1. 
 123. See, e.g., Edward Feser, Taxation, Forced Labor, and Theft, 2 INDEP. REV. 219, 219-35 (2000).   
